Stock Market, Economic Performance, And Presidential Elections by Chien, Wen-Wen et al.
Journal of Business & Economics Research – Second Quarter 2014 Volume 12, Number 2 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 159 The Clute Institute 
Stock Market, Economic Performance,  
And Presidential Elections 
Wen-Wen Chien, State University of New York at Old Westbury, USA 
Roger W. Mayer, Walden University, USA 
Zigan Wang, Columbia University, USA 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Using stock market and economic data from 1900 to 2008 from 27 separate presidential 
administrations in the United States (U.S.), including 15 Republican and 12 Democratic, this paper 
examines the relationships between the market return after each Election Day and economic 
performance during the presidential term. Using the theoretical framework of political economy, 
the authors examine how Wall Street’s reaction to a presidential election acts as a predictive 
measure of future economic performance. The analysis shows that the after-election market 
movement has progressively been more accurate in predicting the future Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) growth but not the future unemployment rates. Given that the results show a higher 
correlation over time, the model appears to provide a good starting point for judging the economic 
potential of future presidential administrations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
.S. presidential elections and the stock market are popular topics for research (Wisniewski, Lightfoot, & 
Lilley, 2012). The reason for this interest is because policies established by the governing president affect 
the ability of businesses and the general economy to prosper. The political economy theoretical 
framework provides a basis for understanding the relationship between politics and the economy. Gilpin (2001) 
describes this relationship as “interactive.” As is seen from the prism of historic events, business attempts to promote 
a political agenda that supports their goals (Caro, 2002). The reason that some business sectors are willing to spare 
massive amounts of money to promote a specific candidate or political agenda is because the winning candidate’s 
agenda has a direct impact on the business environment. Allvine and O’Neil (1980) documented the interaction 
between politics and the market by demonstrating that markets generally follow a four-year business cycle that 
corresponds to the presidential election cycle. The authors’ research adds to this perspective by increasing their 
understanding of how well business and investors gauge the final decision of a presidential election. 
 
Prior researchers examined various elements of the election process to understand the relationship between 
the presidential performance variables and stock market performance. These studies are generally predictive in nature. 
Niederhoffer, Gibbs, and Bullock (1970) documented the changes of Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJI) before and 
after election and nominating conventions for 18 presidents from 1900 to 1968. They also document the one-day, 
one-week and one-month DJI changes after the events and DJI changes during each of the four years under each 
president's administration, reaching a conclusion that the stock market performances during Republican and 
Democratic administrations have no systematic difference. Using data between 1927 and 1998, Santa-Clara and 
Valkanov (2003) determined that the stock market’s excess return is higher under Democratic than Republican 
presidencies and the difference is from higher real stock returns and lower real interest rates but is not explained by 
business-cycle variables and is not concentrated around election dates. 
 
Goodell and Vähämaa (2013) demonstrated that the presidential election process creates market uncertainty 
as investors develop expectations regarding potential winners and future macroeconomic policy. Goodell and Bodey 
(2012) determined that as the probable winner of the election becomes clearer, volatility decreases and markets react 
U  
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negatively with decreases in P/E ratios. Riley and Luksetich (1980) suggest that the results are dependent upon what 
party becomes the clear winner. Huang (1985) documents the higher average returns during Democratic 
administrations, in contrast of the widely held belief that the Republican Party is better at business. Moreover, findings 
from Johnson, Chittenden, and Jensen (1999) also indicate that the returns to small-cap stocks are substantially higher 
during Democratic administrations. 
 
The analysis shows that the after-election market movement has progressively been more accurate in 
predicting the future GDP growth but not the future unemployment rates. Given that the researchers see a higher 
correlation over time, their model appears to provide a good starting point for judging the economic potential of new 
presidential administrations. An additional finding that was not part of the hypothesis was that Republicans tend to 
govern in an economy with unemployment rates that increase during the course of their term. Democrats tend to 
preside over an economy with higher unemployment rates at the beginning of their terms and that tend to decrease over 
time. 
 
The reminder of this paper consists of the research question and hypotheses, research model and data used to 
test hypotheses, empirical results, and a conclusion. 
 
RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHSES 
 
The overreaching research question for this study is, “to what extent does the stock price change immediately 
after a presidential election relate to or predict the presidential administration’ economic performance as defined by 
GDP growth and unemployment?” 
 
H1: There is a relationship between the GDP growth during the term of a presidential administration and the 
change in stock price immediately after the presidential election. 
H2: There is a relationship between unemployment rates during the term of a presidential administration and the 
change in stock price immediately after the presidential election. 
 
Instead of confining their research to just market reactions to the new president, the researchers examined the 
relationship between the market's perspective of each president and the economic performance under each one, 
including GDP growth and the unemployment rate. The goal of this research is to determine if the market is able to 
predict the impact of a president on the economy. The hypotheses are based on the assumption that the stock market 
movement reflects people's perspective of the future economy. The generalized assumption is in the statement that 
when people are positive about the future, the stock market reflects this attitude and increases. Conversely, when 
people have a pessimistic view of the future the market reflects this attitude and decreases. The efficient market 
hypothesis suggests that the market responds to the election winners with all the available information about the 
winning candidate. Thus, the prediction of an efficient market should be right (Fama, 1970). If the market moves up 
after the election, it suggests that the market generally approves the winner's capability of making the economy grow; 
if the market drops, it suggests that the investors are pessimistic about the economy in the future. To the authors’ 
knowledge, there has not been any research verifying the accuracy of the market's prediction and this paper will fill in 
this gap. 
 
RESEARCH MODEL 
 
To test the hypothesis, the researchers use the simple OLS linear regression model to address the correlation 
between the 1-day DJI change following the Election Day and the economic indicators, the four-year cumulative GDP 
growth rate and average unemployment rate. The formula of the model is: 
 
0 1 2t t t tEI DJI X        
 
where EI is the specific economic indicator. The researchers used two separate indicators, including the four-year 
cumulative GDP growth rate in regressions (1) – (4) and the average unemployment rate in regressions (5) – (6). DJI is 
the 1-day DJI percentage change following the Election Day. X is the other explanatory variable, or the four-year lag 
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cumulative GDP growth rate in regressions (1) and (3). The lag GDP growth is a common independent variable for 
explaining or predicting the GDP growth rate. 
 
DATA 
 
The DJI was used to measure the market movement around the Election Day because it has a longer range 
than any other market indices and it traces back to before 1900. The data include stock market and economic 
information from 1900 to 2008 across 27 administrations with 15 of them Republican and 12 Democratic. Table 1 
summarizes the DJI closing price of selected dates in each election year’s November and December around the 
Election Day since 1900. All data is publicly available; DJI was extracted from Bloomberg.
1
 Some data reported by 
Bloomberg were different compared to the dataset used by Niederhoﬀer et al. (1970). The researchers were unable to 
determine the source of this error; however, the differences did not affect the results of hypothesis testing. In 1984, the 
NYSE opened on Election Day for the first time in its 192-year history. So, starting in 1984, the data used was the 
Election Day (Tuesday) closing price rather than the price on Monday before Election Day. 
 
Table 1 (as well as Table 3) shows that among the 13 times that the Democratic Party won the elections, the 
DJI dropped nine times after the Election Day and among the 15 times when the Republicans won, the market rose ten 
times during Wednesday. The sample does not include Obama’s victory in 2012, but the DJI dropped on Wednesday 
after the election. Therefore, since 1900, the market has responded negatively to the Democratic Party’s winning for 
10 out of 14 times in total. 
 
A correlation analysis concludes that the DJI change on Wednesday is closely correlated to the DJI 
movement within the election week (Friday). In addition, it correlates with the DJI movement within two weeks (the 
next Friday) and the DJI return within a month after the election. For brevity, the researchers did not include this 
analysis in the tables. 
 
Table 2 summarizes the yearly GDP growth and unemployment rates since 1900. GDP growth data from 
1901 to 1996 are from Angus Maddison's (2008) Historical Statistics of the World Economy: 1-2008 AD. GDP growth 
data from 1997 to 2011 are from the World Bank. GDP growth in 2012 is from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
The researchers obtained unemployment rates from various sources. Unemployment rates from 1901 to 1930 are from 
Romer (1986), data from 1931 to 1940 are from Darby (1976), data from 1941 to 1947 are from Barro (1977), and data 
after 1948 are from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. The data used for this study comes from the “age 16 and over” 
category (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2013). According to Barro (1977), the annual average unemployment rates 
(data are given in the Economic Report of the President) are based on the total labor force, which includes military 
personnel. Data for 1941-43 is adjusted for treatment of government “emergency workers,” as discussed by Darby 
(1976). Cumulative GDP growth and average unemployment rate are calculated according to each year’s data. 
 
There were some winning candidates who did not ﬁnish their four-year presidency for various reasons. In 
recent times, this includes John F. Kennedy who was assassinated and Richard Nixon who resigned in his second term. 
In each case, the Vice-President took over and completed the terms. Therefore, the economic performance of those 
years should be attributed to combined administration rather than to any single president. 
 
 
                                                          
1 http://www.bloomberg.com/markets/stocks/ 
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Table 1: Summary of Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJI) Around Election Day* 
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190
0 
William McKinley (R) 60.87 11/6/190
0 
62.9 3.33 65.15 7.03 68.19 12.03 65.07 6.90 63.72 4.68 
190
4 
Theodore Roosevelt (R) 66.21 11/8/190
4 
67.07 1.30 68.03 2.75 69.69 5.26 68 2.70 82.22 24.18 
190
8 
William Howard Taft (R) 82.9 11/3/190
8 
84.87 2.38 87.28 5.28 88.38 6.61 86.58 4.44 91.44 10.30 
191
2 
Woodrow Wilson (D) 90.29 11/5/191
2 
91.94 1.83 91.31 1.13 90.09 -0.22 87.88 -2.67 95.05 5.27 
191
6 
Woodrow Wilson (D) 107.21 11/7/191
6 
106.83 -0.35 107.7 0.41 109.62 2.25 106.43 -0.73 76.65 -28.5
0 192
0 
Warren G. Harding (R) 85.48 11/2/192
0 
84.99 -0.57 83.48 -2.34 77.56 -9.27 77.3 -9.57 101.96 19.28 
192
4 
Calvin Coolidge (R) 103.89 11/4/192
4 
105.11 1.17 104.9 0.93 108.96 4.88 111.56 7.38 257.13 147.5
0 192
8 
Herbert Hoover (R) 257.58 11/6/192
8 
260.68 1.20 263.1 2.12 276.66 7.41 279.79 8.62 61.86 -75.9
8 193
2 
Franklin D. Roosevelt (D) 64.58 11/8/193
2 
61.67 -4.51 68.03 5.34 62.96 -2.51 60.05 -7.01 182.25 182.2
1 193
6 
Franklin D. Roosevelt (D) 176.67 11/3/193
6 
180.66 2.26 181.6 2.79 182.65 3.38 180.97 2.43 132.45 -25.0
3 194
0 
Franklin D. Roosevelt (D) 135.21 11/5/194
0 
131.98 -2.39 136.6 1.06 134.74 -0.35 130.33 -3.61 148.87 10.10 
194
4 
Franklin D. Roosevelt (D) 147.92 11/7/194
4 
147.52 -0.27 148.1 0.11 145.77 -1.45 149.23 0.89 188.28 27.29 
194
8 
Harry S Truman (D) 189.76 11/2/194
8 
182.46 -3.85 178.4 -6.00 176.01 -7.25 175 -7.78 265.83 40.09 
195
2 
Dwight D. Eisenhower (R) 270.22 11/4/195
2 
271.29 0.40 273.5 1.20 274.44 1.56 282.05 4.38 490.18 81.40 
195
6 
Dwight D. Eisenhower (R) 495.36 11/6/195
6 
491.14 -0.85 485.3 -2.02 480.66 -2.97 492.73 -0.53 587.30 18.56 
196
0 
John F. Kennedy (D) 597.62 11/8/196
0 
602.25 0.77 608.6 1.84 603.61 1.00 605.16 1.26 876.20 46.61 
196
4 
Lyndon Johnson (D) 875.5 11/3/196
4 
873.81 -0.19 876.9 0.16 874.1 -0.16 870.78 -0.54 950.65 8.58 
196
8 
Richard Nixon (R) 946.23 11/5/196
8 
949.47 0.34 959 1.35 963.7 1.85 977.69 3.32 930.46 -1.67 
197
2 
Richard Nixon (R) 984.8 11/7/197
2 
983.74 -0.11 995.3 1.06 1005.57 2.11 1033.26 4.92 937.00 -4.85 
197
6 
Jimmy Carter (D) 966.09 11/2/197
6 
956.53 -0.99 943.1 -2.38 927.69 -3.97 946.64 -2.01 959.90 -0.64 
198
0 
Ronald Reagan (R) 937.2 11/4/198
0 
953.16 1.70 932.4 -0.51 986.35 5.24 970.48 3.55 1195.89 27.60 
198
4 
Ronald Reagan (R) 1229.24 11/6/198
4 
1233.22 0.32 1219 -0.84 1187.94 -3.36 1170.49 -4.78 2183.50 77.63 
198
8 
George Bush (R) 2124.64 11/8/198
8 
2118.24 -0.30 2067 -2.71 2062.41 -2.93 2141.71 0.80 3200.88 50.66 
199
2 
Bill Clinton (D) 3262.21 11/3/199
2 
3223.04 -1.20 3240 -0.68 3233.03 -0.89 3276.53 0.44 6059.19 85.74 
199
6 
Bill Clinton (D) 6041.67 11/5/199
6 
6177.71 2.25 6220 2.95 6348.03 5.07 6437.1 6.55 10271.72 70.01 
200
0 
George W. Bush (R) 10977.21 11/7/200
0 
10907.06 -0.64 10603 -3.41 10629.9 -3.16 10617.36 -3.28 10137.05 -7.65 
200
4 
George W. Bush (R) 10054.39 11/2/200
4 
10137.05 0.82 10388 3.31 10539 4.82 10585.12 5.28 8519.21 -15.2
7 200
8 
Barack Obama (D) 9625.28 11/4/200
8 
9139.27 -5.05 8944 -7.08 8497.31 -11.72 8635.42 -10.28 13077.34 35.86 
* DJI closing price of the day just before election results were revealed, which was Monday before 1980 and Tuesday since 1984.  
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Table 2: Summary of Yearly GDP Growth and Unemployment Rate under Each President's Administration 
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W. McKinley/T. Roosevelt (R) 1901 11.3 4.59 1902 1.04 4.30 1903 4.86 4.35 1904 -1.26 5.08 16.395 4.580 
Theodore Roosevelt (R) 1905 7.40 4.62 1906 11.5 3.29 1907 1.54 3.57 1908 -8.19 6.17 11.657 4.413 
William Howard Taft (R) 1909 12.2 5.13 1910 1.02 5.86 1911 3.26 6.27 1912 4.68 5.25 22.550 5.628 
Woodrow Wilson (D) 1913 3.95 4.93 1914 -7.7 6.63 1915 2.82 7.18 1916 13.80 5.63 12.265 6.093 
Woodrow Wilson (D) 1917 -2.50 5.23 1918 9.02 3.38 1919 0.87 2.95 1920 -0.95 5.16 6.201 4.180 
W. G. Harding/C. Coolidge (R) 1921 -2.27 8.73 1922 5.53 6.93 1923 13.2 4.80 1924 3.06 5.80 20.310 6.565 
Calvin Coolidge (R) 1925 2.32 4.92 1926 6.52 4.02 1927 1.0 4.57 1928 1.12 5.02 11.314 4.633 
Herbert Hoover (R) 1929 6.12 4.61 1930 -8.9 8.94 1931 -7.8 15.3 1932 -13.20 22.90 -22.530 12.938 
Franklin D. Roosevelt (D) 1933 -2.10 20.60 1934 7.73 16.00 1935 7.65 14.20 1936 14.21 9.90 29.669 15.175 
Franklin D. Roosevelt (D) 1937 4.28 9.10 1938 -3.98 12.50 1939 7.96 11.30 1940 7.73 9.50 16.456 10.600 
Franklin D. Roosevelt (D) 1941 18.20 5.80 1942 20.01 2.90 1943 19.89 1.50 1944 8.38 1.00 84.318 2.800 
F. D. Roosevelt/ H. Truman (D) 1945 -4.02 1.60 1946 -20.64 3.70 1947 -1.51 3.80 1948 3.78 3.80 -22.145 3.225 
Harry S. Truman (D) 1949 0.39 5.90 1950 8.69 5.30 1951 7.61 3.30 1952 3.73 3.00 21.797 4.375 
Dwight D. Eisenhower (R) 1953 4.60 2.90 1954 -0.66 5.50 1955 7.07 4.40 1956 1.95 4.10 13.426 4.225 
Dwight D. Eisenhower (R) 1957 1.88 4.30 1958 -1.01 6.80 1959 7.42 5.50 1960 2.49 5.50 11.032 5.525 
J. F. Kennedy/L. Johnson (D) 1961 2.33 6.70 1962 6.03 5.50 1963 4.32 5.70 1964 5.79 5.20 19.741 5.775 
Lyndon Johnson (D) 1965 6.38 4.50 1966 6.55 3.80 1967 2.50 3.80 1968 4.76 3.60 21.712 3.925 
Richard Nixon (R) 1969 3.13 3.50 1970 0.17 4.90 1971 3.12 5.90 1972 5.30 5.60 12.174 4.975 
R. Nixon/G. R. Ford (R) 1973 5.68 4.90 1974 -0.28 5.60 1975 -0.28 8.50 1976 5.24 7.70 10.596 6.675 
Jimmy Carter (D) 1977 4.53 7.10 1978 5.71 6.10 1979 3.40 5.80 1980 0.05 7.10 14.313 6.525 
Ronald Reagan (R) 1981 2.50 7.60 1982 -1.87 9.70 1983 4.19 9.60 1984 7.28 7.50 12.427 8.600 
Ronald Reagan (R) 1985 3.88 7.20 1986 3.44 7.00 1987 3.52 6.20 1988 4.21 5.50 15.919 6.475 
George Bush (R) 1989 3.46 5.30 1990 1.75 5.60 1991 -0.19 6.80 1992 3.34 7.50 8.580 6.300 
Bill Clinton (D) 1993 2.69 6.90 1994 4.06 6.10 1995 2.54 5.60 1996 3.75 5.40 13.682 6.000 
Bill Clinton (D) 1997 4.50 4.90 1998 4.40 4.50 1999 4.90 4.20 2000 4.20 4.00 19.250 4.400 
George W. Bush (R) 2001 1.10 4.70 2002 1.80 5.80 2003 2.60 6.00 2004 3.50 5.50 9.292 5.500 
George W. Bush (R) 2005 3.10 5.10 2006 2.70 4.60 2007 1.90 4.60 2008 -0.40 5.80 7.464 5.025 
Barack Obama (D) 2009 -3.50 9.30 2010 3.00 9.60 2011 1.70 9.00 2012 2.20 8.10 3.309 9.000 
Average 
  
3.63 6.10 
 
2.34 6.24 
 
3.93 6.24 
 
3.23 6.30 14.33 6.22 
Average since 1953 
  
3.08 5.66 
 
2.39 6.07 
 
3.25 6.11 
 
3.58 5.87 12.86 5.93 
Average (Republican) 
  
4.43 5.21 
 
1.52 5.92 
 
3.03 6.42 
 
1.27 6.99 10.71 6.14 
Average since 1953 (R) 
  
3.26 5.06 
 
0.67 6.17 
 
3.26 6.39 
 
3.66 6.08 11.21 5.92 
Average (Democratic) 
  
2.70 7.12 
 
3.30 6.62 
 
4.97 6.03 
 
5.49 5.49 18.51 6.31 
Average since 1953 (D)   2.82 6.57  4.96 5.93  3.23 5.68  3.46 5.57 15.33 5.94 
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Table 3: Summary of Market's Prediction and 4-Year Economic Performance under Each Administration 
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W. McKinley/T. Roosevelt (R) 1900 3.33 Yes 16.395 2.065 Yes Yes 4.580 -1.640 Yes Yes 
Theodore Roosevelt (R) 1904 1.30 Yes 11.657 -2.673 No No 4.413 -1.808 Yes Yes 
William Howard Taft (R) 1908 2.38 Yes 22.550 8.220 Yes Yes 5.628 -0.593 Yes Yes 
Woodrow Wilson (D) 1912 1.83 Yes 12.265 -2.065 No No 6.093 -0.128 Yes Yes 
Woodrow Wilson (D) 1916 -0.35 No 6.201 -8.129 No Yes 4.180 -2.040 Yes No 
W. G. Harding/C. Coolidge (R) 1920 -0.57 No 20.310 5.980 Yes No 6.565 0.345 No Yes 
Calvin Coolidge (R) 1924 1.17 Yes 11.314 -3.016 No No 4.633 -1.588 Yes Yes 
Herbert Hoover (R) 1928 1.20 Yes -22.530 -36.860 No No 12.938 6.718 No No 
Franklin D. Roosevelt (D) 1932 -4.51 No 29.669 15.339 Yes No 15.175 8.955 No Yes 
Franklin D. Roosevelt (D) 1936 2.26 Yes 16.456 2.126 Yes Yes 10.600 4.380 No No 
Franklin D. Roosevelt (D) 1940 -2.39 No 84.318 69.988 Yes No 2.800 -3.420 Yes No 
F. D. Roosevelt/H. Truman (D) 1944 -0.27 No -22.145 -36.475 No Yes 3.225 -2.995 Yes No 
Harry S Truman (D) 1948 -3.85 No 21.797 7.467 Yes No 4.375 -1.845 Yes No 
Dwight D. Eisenhower (R) 1952 0.40 Yes 13.426 -0.904 No No 4.225 -1.995 Yes Yes 
Dwight D. Eisenhower (R) 1956 -0.85 No 11.032 -3.298 No Yes 5.525 -0.695 Yes No 
John F. Kennedy/L. Johnson (D) 1960 0.77 Yes 19.741 5.411 Yes Yes 5.775 -0.445 Yes Yes 
Lyndon Johnson (D) 1964 -0.19 No 21.712 7.382 Yes No 3.925 -2.295 Yes No 
Richard Nixon (R) 1968 0.34 Yes 12.174 -2.156 No No 4.975 -1.245 Yes Yes 
R. Nixon/Gerald R. Ford (R) 1972 -0.11 No 10.596 -3.734 No Yes 6.675 0.455 No Yes 
Jimmy Carter (D) 1976 -0.99 No 14.313 -0.017 No Yes 6.525 0.305 No Yes 
Ronald Reagan (R) 1980 1.70 Yes 12.427 -1.903 No No 8.600 2.380 No No 
Ronald Reagan (R) 1984 0.32 Yes 15.919 1.589 Yes Yes 6.475 0.255 No No 
George Bush (R) 1988 -0.30 No 8.580 -5.750 No Yes 6.300 0.080 No Yes 
Bill Clinton (D) 1992 -1.20 No 13.682 -0.648 No Yes 6.000 -0.220 Yes No 
Bill Clinton (D) 1996 2.25 Yes 19.250 4.920 Yes Yes 4.400 -1.820 Yes No 
George W. Bush (R) 2000 -0.64 No 9.292 -5.038 No Yes 5.500 -0.720 Yes No 
George W. Bush (R) 2004 0.82 Yes 7.464 -6.866 No No 5.025 -1.195 Yes Yes 
Barack Obama (D) 2008 -5.05 No 3.309 -11.021 No Yes 9.000 2.780 No Yes 
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
GDP growth rates under Democratic administration in the second, third, and the fourth years are greater than 
growth under a Republican administration. The difference in the second year has enlarged since 1953, while the 
diﬀerences in the third and fourth years have shrunk during the second half of the 20th century. The average 
cumulative GDP growth for four years under Democratic administration is 18.51 percent since 1900 and 15.33 percent 
since 1953, while under Republican presidents the numbers are 10.71 percent and 11.21 percent, respectively (see 
Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: GDP Growth Rate Over Time Under Each Party 
* The grey area is Republican administration and the blank area is Democratic administration. 
 
The average Republican administration unemployment rate is higher as compared to Democratic. In addition, 
Republican presidents tend to govern in an economy with increasing rates, while Democratic presidents govern over 
declining unemployment rates. The average unemployment rate under a Republican administration increased from 
5.21 in the ﬁrst year to 6.99 in the last year. This compares to the average unemployment rate under a Democratic 
administration which shows a negative trend. The average unemployment rates of the four years within a Democratic 
presidency term are 7.12, 6.62, 6.03, and 5.49, respectively (see Figure 2). 
 
Table 3 brieﬂy compares each after-election DJI movement (using Wednesday change as the indicator) and 
economic performance within a four-year administration. Since in the long run the US GDP growth rate keeps 
relatively stable (the log US GDP line is famous for that it is almost straight except for some special years), the 
diﬀerence between the GDP growth under each administration and the average GDP growth since 1900 were used as 
the indicator of economic growth. The researchers also use the difference between the average unemployment rate 
under each administration and the average unemployment rate since 1900 as the other indicator of economy. If the DJI 
moves positively, the assumption was that the market is optimistic about the future economy and expects a higher 
growth rate and lower unemployment rate, and vice versa. If the future economic indicators met the market 
expectation, the researchers assess the market conclusion as correct. 
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Figure 2: Unemployment Rate Over Time Under Each Party 
* The grey area is Republican administration and the blank area is Democratic administration. 
 
The data of the individual 28 administrations are divided into three groups with equal length of years. From 
Table 3, it is clear that the market has been more and more accurate in predicting the GDP growth, especially after 
1972. From McKinley to the end of Roosevelt’s ﬁrst term, the market was only three times right about the GDP growth 
and seven times right about the unemployment rate level. From 1936 to the end of Nixon’s second term, the market 
was four times right about the GDP growth and three times right about the unemployment rate level. From 1972 to the 
end of Bush’s second term, the market was seven times right about the GDP growth and four times right about the 
unemployment rate level. If the increasing accuracy of prediction future GDP growth implies the market’s greater 
ability of integrating the candidate’s information, it seems that the market’s movement after election did not reﬂect 
investors’ expectation of the unemployment rate. Instead of concluding that the market is not good at predicting the 
future unemployment rate under a speciﬁc administration, an alternative explanation is that compared to economic 
growth, the unemployment rate is relatively less important in determining the market’s movement direction, under the 
assumption that the market is more and more eﬃcient in evaluating a presidential candidate and his party. 
 
Figures 3, 4, and 5 show more information by presenting the evolution of historical correlations between DJI 
change after Election Day and other indicators of interest. Figure 3 shows the evolution of correlation coeﬃcients 
between DJI change after Election Day and GDP growth. The calculation of correlation coeﬃcients in Figure 3 is as 
follows. For each observation, the value is the correlation coeﬃcient of two time series data, each containing 10 
numbers which indicate 10 administrations in past years - one is the DJI 1-Day Change from Table 1 and the other is 
the Cumulative GDP Growth from Table 2. For example, the value of the observation in 1940 (equal to -0.52) is the 
correlation coeﬃcient of DJI 1-Day Change from 1904 to 1940 (for observation in 1972, it is from 1936 to 1972, 
across 40 years and 10 administrations) and Cumulative GDP Growth during the same period. The higher value in 
later years means the greater match between DJI change after Election Day and the cumulative GDP growth under the 
president’s four-year administration. 
 
The other ﬁgures are generated in a similar way. Figure 4 presents the evolution of correlation coeﬃcients 
between DJI changes after Election Day and the average unemployment rate, and Figure 5 presents the evolution of 
correlation coeﬃcients between DJI change after Election Day and the overall DJI return within four years. 
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Figure 3: Evolution of Correlation between DJI Change after Election Day and GDP Growth of Past 10 Administrations 
 
Figure 4: Evolution of Correlation between DJI Change after Election Day and  
Unemployment Rate of Past 10 Administrations 
 
The ﬁgures show that the market has been more and more accurate and eﬃcient in predicting the future GDP 
growth and the future market return under a president, as the correlation coeﬃcients are increasing. However, the 
correlation coeﬃcients between the DJI change after election and the average unemployment rate keep around zero 
constantly for most of the time. Although the numbers decline in Figure 5 and 4 very recently, the trend is not as clear 
as in the 4-year GDP growth and DJI return ﬁgures. 
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Figure 5: Evolution of Correlation between DJI Change after Election Day and  
DJI Change for 4 Years of Past 10 Administrations 
 
There is a possibility that the results are due to coincidence since the correlation analysis does not ensure the 
causality, as most research has encountered similar problems; but each of stock market, economic indicators, and 
presidential election attracts people’s attention and it is useful to show readers the important relationships between 
them. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Table 4 shows six regressions of which (1), (2), and (5) show the results of a sub-sample of the most recent 
ten administrations from Richard Nixon/Gerald Ford in 1972. Models (1) and (2) show that for the most recent ten 
administrations, the 1-day DJI percentage change following the Election Day is a significant predictor of the 
cumulative GDP growth of the following four years. However, Models (3) and (4) show that the prediction has no 
significant accuracy when all 28 administrations since 1900 are included. Models (5) and (6) show that the 1-day DJI 
percentage change following the Election Day and the average unemployment rate of the following four years has no 
correlation in both the sub-sample and the full sample. 
 
Table 4: Results of Regressions 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Cumulative 
GDP 
Growth 
Cumulative 
GDP 
Growth 
Cumulative 
GDP 
Growth 
Cumulative 
GDP 
Growth 
Average 
Unemployment 
Average 
Unemployment 
DJI 1-Day Change 1.660* 1.533* -0.677 -1.918 -0.385 -0.294 
 (0.699) (0.605) (1.798) (1.678) (0.214) (0.266) 
Lag Cumulative 
GDP Growth 
-0.190 
(0.431) 
 
-0.334 
(0.205) 
   
Constant 14.35* 11.97*** 19.34*** 14.25*** 6.327*** 6.206*** 
 (5.528) (1.166) (4.496) (3.325) (0.412) (0.528) 
N 10 10 28 28 10 28 
R2 0.460 0.446 0.139 0.048 0.288 0.045 
Standard Errors In Parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The authors’ study adds to the literature on examining the relationship between a presidential administration 
and the economy. The researchers demonstrated that GDP growth is associated with the prediction of the Wall Street, 
as defined by the change in stock price immediately after the election. This relationship has strengthened over time. 
The researchers were not able to identify the same relationship between stock market change immediately after an 
election and unemployment. The divergent results may be explained by the political economy framework and the 
strong relationship between business and the presidential administration. Given that the focus of business is on growth 
and not full employment, these results suggest that when Wall Street casts its prediction after an election, the 
prediction focuses on growth and excludes unemployment variables. Additional research is needed to determine how 
GDP, unemployment, and presidential policies interrelate. 
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